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This white paper presents an analysis done by the MAMI 
project of the privacy and security concerns surrounding 
middlebox cooperation protocols (MCPs), based on our 
experimental experience with the Path Layer UDP 
Substrate (PLUS) proposal. Our key finding is that adding 
explicit signaling meant for on-path devices presents no 
significant new attack surface as compared to the status 
quo in the Internet architecture. While middlebox 
cooperation can make a passive adversary’s job easier, it 
does not enable entirely new attacks. 
One of the main goals of the MAMI project is to (re-)enable 
innovation  in  the  transport  layer  and  to  end  ossification  of 
transport  protocols.  Based  on  the  end-to-end  principle,  the 
Internet  was  originally  envisioned  to  consist  of  “smart 
endpoints  and  dumb  pipes,”  where  the  intermediates  only 
know  how  to  move  an  IP  packet  toward  its  destination, 
nothing more. However, not all routers present in the Internet 
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are “dumb”, having been augmented by middleboxes that do all 
kinds of things with transports.
This is problematic because these middleboxes must now look 
at the transport headers or higher layers in order to perform 
their function. And that means that they have to know what 
the transport protocol is, because otherwise they won't know 
where to look. This means that the choice of transport is very 
restricted, and in most cases, that transport will either be TCP 
or alternatively UDP with a specific transport layered on top of 
it. If a packet using a different transport comes along, often a 
middlebox wouldn't know what to do with it and may well drop 
it. This leads to the entrenchment of TCP, or ossification of 
transport protocols.
Another  development  is  ubiquitous  encryption  on  the 
Internet.  This  makes  the  job  of  some  middleboxes  harder 
because they may not be able to look far enough into a packet 
in order to make a decision. The solution in many cases is to 
violate  the  end-to-end  security  property  that  is  nominally 
guaranteed by protocols such as TLS so that the middleboxes 
can do their work. This is an unsatisfactory solution for some. 
However,  reinstating  end-to-end  encryption  including 
transport headers would make many middleboxes blind.
The  solution  proposed  and  developed 
within  the  MAMI  project  is  to  make 
certain information explicit  in a new path 
layer [1] as a shim between the network and 
transport layers, designed explicitly for per-
flow communication with stateful  on-path 
devices. The information exchanged in the 
path layer would, for example, include  
“is this the first packet in a flow?”, “is this 
the last packet in a flow?”, “is this packet more loss-sensitive or 
more latency-sensitive?”, “is there congestion on the path that 
this  packet  traveled  on”,  and  so  on.  With  the  path  layer  in 
place,  the  transport  layer,  including  headers,  could  be 
encrypted while a middlebox could do its work without being 
aware of  the specifics of  the transport protocol  in use.  This 
would  solve  both  problems:  transport  innovation  is  possible 
again because the precise location and meaning of transport-
specific  information  is  no  longer  needed;  and  since  the 
information that a middlebox needs is now provided outside 
the encrypted transport, they are no longer blind.
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In this white paper we address the question of whether such 
middlebox  cooperation  protocols  (MCP)  potentially  pose 
security and privacy issues outweighing the problems that they 
solve, as:
a. MCPs expose information explicitly that adversaries would 
normally have to work for, and
b. MCPs might enable completely new attacks on user privacy.
Of these, (a) is in fact true. Indeed the entire point of an MCP 
is to explicitly expose information that on-path elements would 
otherwise have to work for.  While the MCP is designed for 
beneficial middleboxes, what holds for them must also be true 
for adversaries. MCPs are therefore at best neutral to privacy. 
However, our analysis also indicates that (b) is not true. This 
means that the question of whether or not to employ an MCP 
now  boils  down  to  risk  analysis:  do  the  benefits  of  MCPs 
balance the increased ease with which passive adversaries can 
obtain information? 
To examine this question, we first consider a generalized model 
for  any  protocol  that  exposes  information  for  middlebox 
cooperation,  and then a threat model  for  misusing both the 
information exposed and the mechanisms used to expose it.
A middlebox  cooperation  protocol  provides  mechanism  to 
communication information to the middlebox on the path or 
mechanism  for  middlebox  on  the  transmission  path  to 
communicate  information  to  the  endpoints.  Our  model 
middlebox  cooperation  protocol  is  based  on the  Path  Layer 
UDP Substrate (PLUS) protocol described in detail in our 2017 
CNSM  paper  “A Path  Layer  for  the  Internet:  Enabling 
Network Operations on Encrypted Protocols” [1].  PLUS is a 
dedicated protocol to signal from and to middleboxes between 
an encrypted transport layer and the network layer protocol. 
Based on the analysis of PLUS, our model exposes four types of 
information to on-path devices:
● Identification: for the assignment of packet to a flow. 
All  stateful  in-network  devices  need  to  identify  a 
packet  belong  to  a  flow  as  a  first  step  in  order  to 
perform the desired network function.
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● Flow state: the establishment of a connection between 
two  endpoints,  as  well  as  the  maintenance  and 
disestablishment of that connection. A provision for in-
network  flow  state  is  necessary  today  due  to  the 
prevalence  of  stateful  network  address  translators 
(NATs),  bearers  and tunnels,  and stateful  firewalls  in 
the  Internet  and  often  derived  from  the  cleartext 
information  in  the  TCP header;  lack  of  flow  state 
signaling  leads  to  the  necessity  of  unproductive 
keepalive  traffic to maintain flow state  based on idle 
timeouts. 
● Signaling for packet treatment desired by the endpoint, 
in  terms  of  application  demand  and  transport  layer 
characteristics.
● Measurement  and  measurability,  supporting  on-path 
estimation  of  basic  traffic  metrics  equivalent  to 
unencrypted TCP, such as re-ordering, latency, or loss.
In our model MCP this information is signaled using following 
key types of metadata that are assumed to be directly exposed 
in the (path layer) protocol headers:
● A connection  identifier  identifying  the  flow to  which  a 
packet belongs
● A packet  number  identifying  a  packet  within  the 
sequence of packets in a flow, and to support on-path 
upstream loss measurement
● A packet number echo  used to demonstrate receipt of a 
packet in the opposite direction, and to support two-
way latency measurement
● State signals for signaling flow start and/or flow end, to 
support on-path state maintenance.
● Treatment signals for signaling the tradeoffs a sender is 
willing to make for network treatment of a packet.
In PLUS there is a one-to-one mapping between these types of 
metadata and header fields or flags. Each of these header fields 
has  predefined  semantics  in  the  protocol  specification  and 
cannot be modified undetected by on path devices.
Note that much of this signaling is today provided implicit and 
explicit transport- and network-layer signals; for example, the 
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TCP  wire  image  provides  for  flow  state 
maintenance  (through  the  TCP flags)  and 
mea surab i l i t y  (v ia  sequence  and 
acknowledgment  numbers  a s  we l l  a s 
timestamps).
Our model MCP also provides a facility for 
an  on-path  device  to  explicitly  send  small 
signals to both the sender and a receiver of a 
flow, for example to identify itself as a firewall 
and to advertise its policy, or to assist in the measurement of 
the maximum transmission unit (MTU)  along the path. This 
facility requires endpoint permission for the on-path device to 
send a signal, and uses (encrypted) feedback from the receiver 
back  to  the  sender  to  close  the  loop  (i.e.,  to  allow  the 
middlebox to signal not just to the packet’s receiver, but also its 
sender).
Signaling by on-path middleboxes uses typed, constant-length 
scratch space  allocated in the packet by the sender. These on-
path  middleboxes  are  prevented  from  making  undetected 
changes to the rest  of  the packet by cryptographic integrity 
protection  of  the  entire  header  except  the  content  of  the 
scratch  space,  while  protecting  the  length  and  type  of  the 
scratch space. In contrast to header fields, scratch space has a 
representation and semantics varying according to the values of 
other  header  fields,  and  may  be  writable  by  middleboxes  if 
allowed  (via  the  integrity  protection  mechanism)  by  the 
endpoints.
Key  to  understanding  this  model  is  that  MCPs  provide  a 
cryptographically-reinforced boundary among three classes of 
information:
● information that is solely in the end-to-end trust domain 
(i.e., for the use of the endpoints and any devices with 
which those endpoints share their cryptographic keys);
● information that can be inspected by devices outside 
the end-to-end trust domain, but not modified;
● information  that  can  be  inspected  and  modified  by 
devices outside the end-to-end trust domain. 
While this model is derived directly from our experimentation 
with  PLUS,  other  approaches  to  limited  path  cooperation 
(such as the TLS or QUIC connection IDs, or the QUIC spin 
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bit)  expose some or all  of  the metadata PLUS does.  To our 
knowledge, all approaches in this space fit this model, though 
there  are  some  which  operate  primarily  through  selective 
expansion  of  the  end-to-end  trust  domain.  We  therefore 
consider our analysis to be generalizable.
We  build  upon  the  attacker  model  for  a  pervasive  passive 
observer outlined in RFC 7624 [2], “Confidentiality in the Face 
of  Pervasive  Surveillance”.   We  draw  additional  inspiration 
from Detecting and Defeating TCP/IP Hypercookie Attacks, 
[3],  which  examined  side-channels  in   existing  transport 
protocols.
We call the endpoint that initiates communication the client, 
and the other endpoint the server.  We call the endpoint that 
sends a packet the sender, and the other endpoint the recipient.
Generalizing  from  the  MCP model  above,  we  assume  the 
potential  presence  of  header  fields  and  scratch  space,  with 
varying levels of integrity protection. The headers and scratch 
space of a MCP must be exempt from encryption because they 
exist  to  communicate  to  middleboxes  with  whom  the 
endpoints have no cryptographic association.
We assume  that  communication  is  encrypted  and  integrity 
protected by default at or above the transport layer, because 
this  is  increasingly  the  case.  We will  explicitly  identify  any 
attack that requires plaintext communication. By default the 
only information that an attacker can extract is metadata, and 
it  has  long been known that  metadata  can be  used to  infer 
information about the data. 
Out-of-band identification methods, e.g., linking a flow's five- 
or six-tuple with an identifier and using some other protocol to 
export  this  linkage,  are  also  not  considered,  because  it  is 
practically impossible for users and remote endpoints to detect 
and defeat. We say metadata is exposed  when it can be either 
recorded or inferred.
Taking RFC 7624 [2]  as the basis of our attacker model,  we 
consider  passive  adversaries  that  are  however  allowed  some 
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modification  of  the  packet,  if  this  furthers  its  goals.  In 
summary, our attackers:
● “can observe every packet of all communications at any 
hop in any network path between the endpoints (this 
means the client cannot use anonymisation services like 
Tor)”;
● “can observe  data  at  rest  in  any intermediate  system 
between the endpoints controlled by the endpoints”;
● “can share information with other such attackers”; and
● may  take  other  actions  with  respect  to  these 
communications (e.g., blocking, modification, injection, 
etc.),  as  long  as  these  actions  do  not  cause  the 
communication to be totally disrupted.
In contrast to RFC 7624, we also consider an attacker that can 
also perform active attacks (short of denial of service). Blocking 
actions that fall short of denial of service include:
● dropping a single packet to force retransmission by the 
sender's transport layer;
● blocking requests to certain DNS servers to force use 
of other DNS servers;
● blocking  TLS-protected  communications  to  force 
unprotected communications;
● shutting down a selected number of links in a multi-
path scenario and thus forcing the multi-path transport 
to  use  specific  links,  on  which  surveillance  may  be 
easier.
We stipulate that our attackers want to:
● remain undetected, if possible; and
● extract  as  much  information  as  possible  about  the 
communication between the endpoints.
The  attacker  generally  wants  to  remain  undetected  if  at  all 
possible,  but  this  requirement  might  be  relaxed  if  the 
consequences of detection are outweighed by the usefulness of 
the attack. This can happen for example if the attacker is so 
powerful that detection is without consequence (low risk), or if 
the attack, if successful, would give the attacker information of 
extremely high value (high pay-off).
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Classes of Manipulation
At a very high level, we may distinguish between two different 
and orthogonal features of manipulation:
● Manipulation that is  detectable by the endpoint.  For 
example, changing information that has been integrity-
protected. We call this class of manipulation “class D”.
● Manipulation  that  changes  the  observed  protocol 
behaviour. For example, by dropping single packets to 
force  packet  retransmission.  We  call  this  class  of 
manipulation “class P”.
These classes are orthogonal because there are manipulations 
that fall into any of the four combination of class. For example, 
changing information that is integrity protected falls into class 
D, but may or may not fall into class P. Dropping packets falls 
into  classes  !D  and  P (if  the  protocol  does  retransmission), 
while changing the data in a packet and then changing it back 
before delivering it to the remote point falls into !D and very 
probably also into !P.
Since a  mostly  passive attacker wants  to remain undetected, 
attacks that are in class D are undesirable, and attacks in class 
P may or may not also be undesirable, depending on whether 
the observed change in protocol behaviour is advantageous for 
the attacker or not.
Purely passive attacks are by necessity in class D, and attackers 
will prefer class (!D, !P) over (!D, P) over (D, *).
We first consider the actions available on an MCP to an on-
path attacker following our attacker model above and then also 
examine the privacy and security implications of each type of 
information  included  in  an  MCP,  on  a  per  type  basis 
(identification, state, and treatment) as whole as a whole (for 
fingerprinting).  MCPs  need  only  concern  themselves  with 
these attacks when they support the specific mechanisms or 
information considered.
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Data Exfiltration via Header Fields
Our  model  MCP cooperates  with  its  overlying  transport 
protocol to provide integrity protection for certain parts of its 
header or payload integrity. However, to be effective, integrity 
protection has to be checked and acted upon. If  the MCP’s 
specification  does  not  mandate  that  integrity  protection 
failures should cause hard failure of a connection, an attacker 
could manipulate header fields to cause different treatment by 
downstream  middleboxes.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be 
inappropriate for an explicit path layer protocol, like PLUS, to 
decide  unilaterally  that  packets  that  fail  the  integrity  check 
MUST be dropped. It may be that the packet payload carries 
identifying and authenticating information outside of a crypto 
context,  and  it  may  be  that  in  certain  circumstances, 
availability is more valuable than confidentiality. In these cases, 
it  is  perfectly  acceptable  to  leave  the  decision  whether  to 
accept or reject a packet to the overlaying transport.
It  is  not  completely  clear  how these  header  fields  could  be 
usefully exploited by an attacker acting at a single point in the 
network,  since  metadata  insertion  or  data  exfiltration  is 
complicated by at least two factors:
● The amount of metadata per packet is limited (often on 
the order of a few bits) and exposed metadata should in 
general  be  minimal  with  respect  to  the  use  case  the 
information is exposed for;
● Changing the bits might result in unwanted outcomes 
(class P). 
These complicating factors  are  mitigated if  the attacker  can 
control both sides of the connection; in this case, the attacker 
can rewrite any header field which does not interfere with end-
to-end transmission and,  as  long  as  the  changes  are  undone 
before the packet reaches the remote endpoint,  the attacker 
can  exfiltrate  data  to  the  network  portion  between  the 
attacker's ingress and egress nodes. This can be done in a way 
that is undetectable by either endpoint. In a more generic case, 
this  type  of  attack  requires  a  side  channel  for  coordination 
between the attacker's nodes.
However,  this  mode  of  attack  is  not 
specif ic  to  middlebox  cooperation 
protocols: the present protocol stack has 
many header fields that can be practically 
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exploited in this way even without middlebox cooperation (e.g., 
IPv4's  IPID on non-fragmenting paths,  IPv6's  Flow ID).  As 
these are often unauthenticated, two-point control might not 
even be necessary. For an exhaustive investigation of this kind 
of  attack,  see  also  Detecting  and  Defeating  TCP/IP 
Hypercookie Attacks [3].
For integrity-protected headers,  this  attack is  in class  (D, *), 
and hence not preferred. For other headers, this attack is in 
class (!D, *), and very probably in class (!D, !P), and hence much 
preferred.
Data Exfiltration Through Scratch Space
For payload data that is not integrity-protected, such as scratch 
space,  exfiltration  becomes  a  much  more  attractive  option, 
since manipulation of scratch space is potentially undetectable 
by the endpoint. But even here, an attacker must exercise some 
care  not  to  trigger  unwanted (to  the  attacker)  behaviour  by 
manipulating  the  scratch  space.  The  utility  of  this  attack  is 
starkly limited when (as in our model MCP) the size and type 
of  the  scratch  space  is  integrity  protected  by  the  receiving 
endpoint, and the size and type (indeed, the very presence) of 
the scratch space is under the sending endpoint’s control.
This attack is in class (!D, *), and therefore desirable. However, 
it is an active attack that might not be preferred by a mostly 
passive adversary.
Coercion of Scratch Space
Further,  access  networks  could  require  endpoint  owners  to 
supply  packets  with  specified  scratch  space  or  otherwise  to 
refuse to forward the packets,  or to refuse to forward them 
speedily. This would follow the familiar pattern in which opt-in 
solutions to data tracking decay to a more mandatory position, 
as companies only offer certain services to users who do in fact 
opt in. People who choose not to opt in are unable to use this 
service. If there is one dominant service of its kind available 
(e.g.,  Facebook  or  Twitter),  or  if  there  is  only  one  viable 
alternative, people may find they have no choice and need to 
opt in.
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Access network providers or even core networks could do the 
same to ease data exfiltration. They could force endpoints to 
provide scratch space, or face the penalty of being dropped or 
of being put into the slow lane if they do not comply.
This  attack  is  in  class  (D,  !P),  and  also  active,  and  would 
therefore not be preferred by the mostly passive adversary.
Connection Identification and Linkability
Identification  and  linkability  of  packets  to  connections  or 
across  connections  is  possible  through  any  number  of 
constructs in the packet header. Here we consider two types of 
linkable identifier, as provided in our model MCP: connection 
identifiers and (echoed) packet numbers.
A connection identifier  (CID)  is  a  transport  layer  construct 
that allows endpoints and middleboxes to uniquely identify an 
end-to-end connection/session even if  the  underlying  5-tuple 
changes due to NAT re-bindings,  connection migration with 
multi-homing  or  multi-path.  Examples  of  middleboxes  that 
could  utilise  this  information  include  load  balancers  and 
firewalls.
The  existence  of  an  explicit  CID is  especially  important  in 
association  with  encrypted  protocols  where  session  re-
negotiation involves a handshake that is expensive in terms of 
computation  and  latency.  The  presence  of  a  CID does  not 
affect  the  overall  security  of  the  session  with  respect  to 
authentication,  confidentiality  and  integrity.  The  intrinsic 
properties  of  the  CID,  though,  have  obvious  privacy 
implications. Namely, the ability of a passive on-path attacker 
to  relate  packets  belonging  to  the  same  logical  flow  (and 
therefore determine whether two or more items of interest are 
coupled), this introduces linkability (see RFC6973). Therefore, a 
good CID design should take this into account and seek, as 
much  as  possible,  to  avoid  linkability  by  passive  on-path 
adversaries  between multiple  source addresses  /  ports  during 
mobility  or  NAT rebind  scenarios.  This  may  not  be  always 
possible - e.g., when clients are unaware of the address change 
(for example, when passing through NATs.)  An example of a 
design  that  satisfies  this  requirement  is  the  HOTP-based 
construction in draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-cid.
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Packet numbers and echoes (as provided in our model MCP, 
and ubiquitously present in Internet traffic in a different form, 
as  TCP sequence  and  acknowledgment  numbers)  are  also 
usable for linkability. From the passive observer’s point of view, 
they  are  a  “poor  man's  connection  identifier”.  In  this 
discussion, we assume that packet numbers start with a random 
initial number in a given number space and are incremented for 
each  new packet  sent,  as  in  TCP and the  PLUS PSN.   An 
attacker may assume that a packet seen with a packet number 
that is not within a small delta of other known packet numbers 
probably belongs to a new connection. Likewise, a packet seen 
by the attacker that is within a small delta, but has a different 
source IP, probably indicates a change of the endpoint source 
IP  address.  These  conclusions,  however,  come  with  some 
uncertainty,  so PSN information is  in this  sense less  reliable 
than CID from the attacker’s point of view.
An important security property of a CID or initial PSN is that 
it should be unpredictable and difficult  for an off-path attacker 
to guess, for example to prevent an adversary to blindly reset a 
transport session or confuse a  firewall  about the state of  its 
monitored flows. 
There are multiple possible design options for implementing 
connection  identifier  selection  (server  picks,  client  picks, 
negotiated,  mono  or  bi-directional  -  see  e.g.  PLUS,  QUIC, 
draft-rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id,  draft-mavrogiannopoulos-
tls-cid,  draft-barrett-mobile-dtls,  IPsec).  The  one  that  is 
emerging with QUIC gives the server the ability to pick the 
CID that best suits the server. This is to allow load balancers to 
work cooperatively with servers by using the CID to identify 
which server to send traffic towards, preferably in a stateless 
manner.  There  are  caveats  to  be  aware  of  when  using  this 
approach:
● The opportunity for selective DoS, i.e.,  overloading a 
particular  backend  server  behind  the  load  balancer. 
This  could  be  avoided  /  mitigated  by  including  a 
lightweight authenticator that the load balancer can use 
to drop CID values that don't validate;
● A privacy problem related to the potential leakage of 
topological information about the server farm.
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Attacks  against  CID and PSN/PSE are  in  class  (!D,  !P),  but 
there  are  privacy-preser ving  designs  for  connection 
identification, as well.
Information Exposure of State Signals
The state signals in our MCP model are designed to signal start 
of  flow  and  end  of  flow.  These 
signals  can  drive  an  abstract, 
transport- independent  state 
machine shown in the figure here; 
however,  this  state  machine  is 
merely one instance of a set of on-
path state maintenance behaviors.
This  state  machine  is  primarily 
used  to  se lect  among  three 
timeouts  (short  idle  and  stopping 
timeouts,  and  a  longer  associated 
timeout)  after which the on-path 
state  for  a  flow will  be dropped. 
Selection  among  these  timeouts 
allows  endpoints  to  reduce  or 
eliminate unproductive keep-alive 
traffic needed to maintain on-path 
state and thereby end-to-end connectivity in the presence of 
NAT or other stateful on-path treatment.
The only possible active attack on the state signals lead to the 
premature selection of a shorter timeout. Careful design of the 
state  signaling  can  mitigate  this  attack:  notice  in  the  state 
diagram  above  (the  stopwait  and  stopping  states)  that  both 
endpoints must send a stop signal  before a device observing 
both directions of a flow adjusts its timeout down, requiring an 
attacker to have cooperating injection points on both sides of 
the on-path device.
Active attacks are in class (D, *).
Treatment Signals
Packet Treatment Signals are signals from the sending endpoint 
to the path, informing on-path devices that a packet should be 
treated according to certain conditions.
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PLUS for example has a Loss/Latency signal that says whether 
the packet is more sensitive to loss or more sensitive to latency. 
This  is  specified as  a  1-bit  sender-to-path signal  that  can be 
asserted on a per-packet basis. Its function is very similar to the 
one described in Latency Loss Tradeoff PHB Group. The main 
difference is that, in PLUS, the flag is included in the integrity 
protected envelope of the overlying transport, which makes it 
not as easily malleable as its DiffServ code-point counterpart. 
We consider this signal as an example of other types of simple, 
tradeoff-based treatment signals.
From the perspective of a passive on-path observer, the Loss/
Latency signal provides information about the class of traffic 
carried by a certain packet; namely, whether the packet can - or 
cannot - be associated with a source of latency sensitive traffic. 
This coarse categorization partitions the traffic space into two 
broad  classes  whose  boundary  can  be,  at  times,  a  bit  fuzzy. 
Examples of low-latency services include stock market flows to 
high frequency trading systems,  real-time media  applications 
(VoIP, interactive conferencing, etc.), game streaming services 
(e.g.,  Mixer,  Twitch)  and  WebRTC-based  low-latency  live 
streaming.  The  latter  is  one  example  of  an  application  that 
might interchangeably fall into one category or the other. (In 
fact,  live streaming is  often carried over an adaptive bit-rate 
bearer such as MPEG-DASH or HLS, which favours buffering 
over packet loss at queueing nodes.)
As described in Shbair et al.  in A Multi-Level Framework to 
Identify HTTPS Services, state of art encrypted traffic analysis 
based machine learning can successfully  identify  the type of 
transported application (e.g., HTTPS, SMTP, P2P, VoIP, SSH, 
Skype) with good accuracy and without any need to access the 
clear-text. In this context, and despite its limitations (i.e., fuzzy, 
coarse grained), the Loss/Latency (LoLa) signal might be used 
to improve the precision of the classifier. This signal is non-
malleable  (can  not  be  changed  on-path).  In  contrast,  the 
DiffServ  field  used  to  carry  a  DSCP,  can  be  updated  at  a 
DiffServ edge router to map to available QoS treatments or to 
aggregate classes (including in some cases bleaching the field). 
The sender thus has no incentive to lie about the MCP LoLa 
marking, making it slightly more reliable signal compared using 
DiffServ.
Such attacks are in class (!D, !P).
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Fingerprinting Attacks 
If a protocol provides (optional)  capabilities to communicate 
with devices on a path either by requesting information from 
the  path  or  providing  information  to  the  path,  then  an 
observer can use the patterns of this communication such as 
frequency of such communication and the kind of requested or 
provided information as a fingerprint. This could possibly allow 
the  observer  to  reason  about  the  application  using  the 
protocol .  For  example ,  appl icat ions  that  use  such 
communication  for  high-precision  RTT estimations  can  be 
identified  from  applications  that  do  not  require  such 
estimations by observing whether requests for high-precision 
RTTs are observed.
The  very  presence  of  scratch  spaces  can  also  be  used  as  a 
fingerprinting  vector:  an  application  or  transport  that  uses 
scratch space reveals a little more of itself to the network. In 
other  words,  the  pattern  and  frequency  of  requested  PCFs 
could help identify the application.
Looking at the previous sections in another way, we find the 
following attacks/features in classes (!D, !P), the most desirable 
class, or (!D, P), the next most desirable:
● Data  exfiltration  through  scratch  space  (an  active 
attack)
● Connection identifier
● Packet treatment signals
● Packet  number  (as  a  diminished  form of  connection 
identifier)
The  active  attack  of  data  exfiltration 
through scratch space can be performed by 
any  two  colluding  middleboxes  simply  by 
one  middlebox  sending  datagrams  to  the 
other.  Network  monitoring  may  detect 
these  packets,  however,  it  is  currently 
unusual for two middleboxes to talk to each 
other directly.
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In general, middlebox cooperation does not 
enable any new classes of attacks beyond what 
is already possible with standard TCP or 
UDP and encrypted payload.
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The  passive  attacks  on  a  connection  identifier  can  be 
performed today by middleboxes observing five-tuples. Giving 
an  explicit  connection  identifier  will  make  the  job  of  the 
passive attacker easier. Packet treatment signals such as loss/
latency  can  already  be  inferred  from  traffic  characteristics, 
transport protocol port numbers, or endpoint address.
With  TCP,  packet  numbers  are  implicitly  present  and  also 
carried  in  acknowledgment  numbers.  In  contrast,  the  UDP 
protocol  header  does  not  specify  any  sequence  numbers  - 
although protocols layered on top of UDP may introduce these 
(e.f., RTP, SCTP, DCCP). Other network-layer encapsulations 
may permit the use of sequence numbers (e.g. in a GRE option 
field), but do not normally have a sequence number field that is 
observable by devices on the path.
An MCP, no matter how it may be constructed, will most likely 
have information with fixed formats and meaning, as well  as 
free-form information. Information with fixed formats can be 
abused  for  data  exfiltration  and  linkability,  but  under  the 
assumption that such data is integrity-protected, and under the 
requirement that normal operation should not be disrupted too 
much, it should be restored to a close-to-original state before 
being delivered to the receiver. That limits the abuse potential 
of that data.
The fixed-form data present in an MCP protocol header are of 
course dual-use:  for any legitimate use of  MCP header data, 
there  is  an  equal  and  opposite  abuse.  For  example,  a  loss/
latency indicator could be used to distinguish real-time traffic 
from  file  downloads;  start  and  stop  bits  could  be  used  to 
delimit  flows,  and so on.  The opportunities  for  this  kind of 
abuse are however not different from the possibilities present 
in TCP.
The potential for new abuse comes from introducing free-form 
data, which seems to present a practically unlimited amount of 
scratch space with which an attacker could exfiltrate data. On 
the surface, this seems to provide a potential for attacks against 
privacy. But network operators can encapsulate packets or add 
tunnel headers, or set tags in existing encapsulations. They can 
also  export  flow  information  that  allows  other  devices  to 
measure  the  traffic  or  react  in  a  particular  way.  These 
techniques are readily applied within a single operator domain, 
but  become  more  difficult  to  coordinate  across  network 
boundaries.
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To  use  scratch  space  for  intra-network  exfiltration,  the 
adversary has to control a portion of the path through which 
the  packets  travel.  Such  an  adversary  could  also  use  other 
means to accomplish the same effect, without even changing 
the original packets. One easy way would be for an adversary to 
send  control  datagrams  to  an  on-path  device.  A network 
operator therefore has many more tools to help support the 
service that is  required from their customers.  IP destination 
address  is  often  a  pretty  helpful  indicator  to  determining 
pattern of use.
Middlebox cooperation may make the attacker's job easier in 
some cases, for example by giving it information explicitly that 
it would otherwise have to work to get, by making classifiers 
more  accurate,  and  so  on.  However,  in  general,  middlebox 
cooperation does not enable any new classes of attacks beyond 
what  is  already  possible  with  standard  TCP or  UDP and 
encrypted payload.
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